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This paper reports on aspects of land tenure in western Sudan, especially the nature of tenure
insecurity and the functioning of the land rental market.  The active land rental market accounted
for about one-third of cultivated land.  Patterns of land rental transactions, and tests of the
importance of insecurity in renting land, where the owner may not be able to reclaim land rented
out, do not support the presumption that rental markets perform poorly.  The role of the sheikh as
administrator of village land, and the claims of large landowners to vast tracts, are, however,
important political problems that must be resolved before attempts at 'rationalizing' land tenure.
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1.  Introduction
The salient and surprising feature of land tenure in Bireka1, a small village in Sheikan
district in western Sudan, is the extent of the land rental market, and the unproblematic nature
of rental transactions.  There seem to be few impediments to renting land.  Consider the case of
how Idris Hassan, a young Hausa farmer, went about renting land.  His father had died the
previous year, and he and his two other brothers tried to farm the plots which their father had
rented.  When they argued over who was bearing the burden of the work, Idris decided to
acquire land on his own.  For weeks he talked about how he would go and see El Dau Hussein,
the wealthy son of a large landowner from a neighboring village.  El Dau was the market clerk,
and did not have time to farm all of his father's holdings.  It was not until the beginning of July,
well into the rainy season, that Idris paid him a visit.  The two men reached a quick agreement
to rent fifteen mukhammas (a mukhammas is roughly equivalent to one hectare) of fallow land. 
Payment would be LS 10 per mukhammas as advance money and a ten percent share at the
end of the season.  Idris then divided up the field, and distributed eleven mukhammas in plots of
varying sizes to friends in the village, all good farmers.  They would pay him the LS 10 advance
charge, and he would give it to El Dau.  Not only did Idris rent from El Dau without formalities,
witnesses or elaborate rituals, but he also sub-leased to others.
The uncomplicated rental transaction between El Dau and Idris accords well with recent
work that has warned against the idea that states in Africa should implement comprehensive
land tenure programs to resolve problems of tenure insecurity.  There are two reasons for this
caution.  First, indigenous tenure institutions appear to be capable of guaranteeing security and
thus encouraging investment and the efficient allocation of land.2  Second, the weakness of
state and local bureaucracies means that implementation of reforms is likely to be ineffective.3 
The conflicts that result from haphazard attempts at reform may increase, rather than decrease,
insecurity.
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This paper shows that analogous conditions and conclusions hold for Sheikan.  This is
not to claim that tenure in Sheikan is entirely problem-free.  Farmers often speak of tenure
insecurity as consisting of an imperfect ability to reclaim rented land.  Poor or credit-constrained
landowners might be afraid that if they rented land to more effective users they might lose their
ownership rights.  Many villagers who arrived after the initial founding of a village worry about
accusations that the land they farm is really rented land, and can be taken away.  This 'rental
insecurity' might generate an efficiency loss from over-extensive cultivation and an under-
investment in fallowing.  It also bodes ill for the growing trend of investing in irrigated market
gardens along the seasonal streams (khur); farmers may be discouraged from digging wells and
planting trees if the land is going to be contested.  But the magnitude of the inefficiencies
created by rental insecurity may be small.  The existence of a common rhetoric or perception of
rental insecurity may not accurately reflect social practice.  Indeed, the second part of the paper
argues that unconstrained land rental transactions like that between Idris and El Dau are normal
and frequent.  Data indicate that the rental market is extensive, and a statistical test supports
the hypothesis of a well-functioning market.
A considered approach to the problem of land tenure in Sheikan would weigh these
possibly small inefficiencies against the costs of intervention.  These are likely to be very high. 
The first part of this paper explores the discourses surrounding rental insecurity, and argues
that ambiguous local and national interpretations and policies regarding the position of village
sheikhs and other 'tribal' leaders, as both administrators of village land and owners of private
land, are responsible for the persistence of insecurity.4  Land tenure and rental are deeply
imbricated in fundamental political structures.  Thus intervention in land tenure should proceed
with caution for two reasons: the existing rental market performs adequately, and the political
problems associated with resolving rental insecurity are not at all simple. 
2.  Land Tenure in Sheikan: 'System' and Contestation
3Household compounds form the basic social units of Sheikan; no lineage groups
organized by kinship corporately undertake significant economic or social activities.  The sixty
households of Bireka, for instance, are almost all nuclear or generationally extended families,
with only five cases of households of brothers, and five female-headed households.  The region
is characterized by considerable ethnic heterogeneity.  In Bireka villagers locate their
residences along ethnic lines: Arabs (twenty households) are members of ethnic groups which
consider themselves to be indigenous to the area; Burgo (thirteen households) are originally
from Chad; Hausa and Bornu (twenty-five households) are from Nigeria.  Other villages are
similarly mixed, though single-ethnic villages are also common.
Households differ sharply in economic status, with the wealthy owning substantial assets
(such as lorries, electric generators, bakeries, livestock, and small shops).  Very poor
households rely on daily earnings from the active wage labor market for subsistence.  Almost all
households pursue agricultural activities during the rainy season and wage labor, self-
employment or trading activities during the off-season.  For the most part, farmers hoe their
fields with simple hand tools, and share the same basic production technology and crop
varieties (sorghum, millet, sesame and groundnuts).  Few modern inputs are used, and there is
no animal traction and only occasional use of tractors.  In the harsh environment crops fail
frequently. 
Land in Bireka and surrounding villages is fairly completely cultivated, but open
expanses of uncleared land exist.  Farmers have no difficulty articulating a 'system' of tenure
that governs these two types of land.  Areas of uncleared land are known as ghifar, and are
administered by a village sheikh and his superiors in the hierarchy of traditional leadership, the
omda (district leader), and nazir ('tribal head').  Ghifar land may be distributed to villagers,
newcomers or residents of neighboring villages, and the sheikh may collect the futra, a ten
percent harvest share.  As long as he collects the futra, he retains 'ownership' rights, in trust for
the village, 'against' outside acquisition of the land.  Usufruct is, however, transferred to the
4farmer and his descendants.  This right is derived from the farmer having cleared the field, or
'opened' the land.
If the sheikh stops collecting the futra, then ownership rights are transferred to the
farmer and his or her descendants.  These 'rights' of ownership consist basically of not having
to pay the futra in the future.  If the current sheikh died, a new sheikh might claim that he was
due rent on the land.  The farmer would then claim that the previous sheikh had not collected
rent, and so now he owned the land.  So villagers will often distinguish land according to
whether 'it belongs to them’ (haggahum) or whether 'it belongs to them by ownership’
(haggahum milik).
Not all farmers interpret the 'system' in the same way.  One of the salient ambiguities of
tenure in Sheikan concerns whether there is, in fact, any such thing as ghifar land.  Many
members of old families indigenous to the area claim ownership rights over ghifar land.  They
say they acquired these rights centuries ago during the time when power in Kordofan see-
sawed between the Funj kingdom in Sennar and the Sultanate of Darfur.  The omda and his
brothers in Bireka were reputed to own thousands of mukhammas in the uncultivated bush land
between Bireka and the administrative center of Alloba to the south.  These landowners claim
they can rent out to other farmers without losing their usufruct rights if they collect a cash
payment at the beginning of each season (dugundi5, or hag al shy, lit. 'tea money').  That is,
they can in theory reclaim land rented out.
This ambiguous legal status of ghifar land colors the relations among landowners and
sheikhs and omda's.  Two Arab families who had moved from a village to the west of Bireka
claimed that they owned hundreds of mukhammas there.  They had authorized the sheikh of
that village to collect futra and use it for village development; thus they believed they were
maintaining their claims to the land.
Not every sheikh and omda, whose positions are legitimated in complex ways by
principles of inheritance, Islamic rhetoric, and notions of good governance, accommodates the
5claims of landowners.  A case heard in the Sheikan district court in June of 1990 concerned a
man who had left his village to live in the town of Um Ruwaba.  In his absence, the sheikh
appropriated and distributed 105 mukhammas of his land.  The sheikh was collecting rent on
this land; when the plaintiff returned he claimed the land, and the rent.  The case was taken to
the omda, who rejected it.  Subsequently the old sheikh died, and a member of the plaintiff's
family was made sheikh.  The case was brought up again.  The son of the old sheikh
maintained that the land belonged to his father.  Three witnesses for the plaintiff, including the
new sheikh, however, claimed the contrary.  The court postponed the case until the defendant
produced his witnesses.
The technical point that complicates these cases is that cultivated land that has been
abandoned through out-migration, or left unclaimed after a villager has died, reverts to the
authority of the sheikh.  In allocating this cleared land, the sheikh is also not subject to the same
necessary transfer of usufruct rights engendered by the opening of previously uncultivated land. 
He too can collect a cash dugundi payment.  He too can reclaim rented land.
One of the main reasons why landowners and sheikhs are increasingly interested in
reclaiming rented land is that a land market is slowly developing.  In Sheikan most people
refuse to recognize a right to sell goz land, the sandy uplands that constitute the great bulk of
village land, but since the drought of 1985 some farmers have sold plots along the seasonal
watercourses where irrigated orchards and vegetable gardens have been established.  And in
neighboring districts people are buying land.  Consider the following letter on file at the office of
the majlis:
"We the complainants are the representatives of the residents of Abu
Khureis village, who are 57 persons.  We present to you our complaint
against the sheikh.  He has acted independently and sold 600
mukhammas to Fellata of El Obeid, despite our having formed a local
committee to distribute this land to the village residents in 1986.  But the
distribution has not been carried out until now.  And the sheikh insists
that this land belongs to him by inheritance from his father.  This land
did not belong to his father; the land pertains to the villagers and we
have been wronged by the sheikh's action.  The nazir knows this.  The
6omda also knows that this land is not part of the inheritance of the
sheikh.  So we ask you to bring about justice."
Fifty-seven villagers signed the letter, all of them conscious of this major ambiguity in tenure: the
sheikh is almost always both an owner of private land and an administrator of village ghifar land. 
This ambiguity leads to disputes between sheikhs and villagers.
An analogous case in the majlis files concerns a dispute in 1969 between the villagers of
Berti and the leaders of the Bederiya tribe.  The sheikh of the village, a Bederi, was distributing
land he claimed was ghifar to members of his own tribe, even though villagers of other tribes
were already farming the land.  In his eyes, since they had not formally requested permission, or
paid the futra, the land remained ghifar even though it was cleared.  Government officials visited
the village and formed a committee representing all the village tribes: Bederiya, Berti, Mima,
Gura'an and dar Hamid.  The committee was ordered to distribute the ghifar land, independently
of the sheikh.  The criterion was that land should be distributed to those who had little.  Six
years later the issue was still not resolved, and the regional commissioner was asked to
implement the distribution.
In Bireka, the sheikh claimed ownership over parcels three times in the 1990 rainy
season.  Each time he asserted that those cultivating the land were renters and had not paid
rent.  In one case he had sold land to a man from El Obeid, who intended to cultivate a market
garden.  A woman who had left the village after her husband died claimed the land.  She
produced witnesses who testified that she and her family had farmed the area for 38 years.  The
court agreed with the plaintiff, and found that the sheikh had no right to appropriate the land.  An
appeals court supported the ruling.  In a second dispute, the sheikh wished to sell a piece of
land close to the river where an interested buyer wanted to establish an irrigated garden.  The
land had been farmed for at least 40 years by a Hausa family, who confidently predicted that
were the sheikh try to sell the land he would find himself involved in a court case that he would
lose.  While the sheikh declined to press the matter, he was more vigorous in the third dispute,
7trying to claim the land of a poor Arab farmer.  He was however persuaded, after loud
arguments and interventions by other villagers who feared an escalation of tense inter-ethnic
relations in the village, to desist from his claims.
Idioms of land as gift and land as reward are used by these recent migrants and renters
in making claims of ownership against landowners and sheikhs.  Sheikhs supposedly gave out
land in order to "settle" the country.6  Ahmed notes that, "a successful and fortunate Nazir would
attract cultivations [sic] in his Dar [homeland]."7  Migrants from the far west of Sudan and
beyond, who make up a considerable fraction of the population, legitimize their claims to land
ownership, and security of tenure, with reference to their reward (land) for settling in a particular
place rather than another.  Popular rhetoric has it that if someone farms a plot for a given
number of years (the number varies from speaker to speaker, but the most common number is
three years) without paying rent, then the local court in Jaibat will decide in favor of the renter
when settling an ownership dispute.  (Both sides may bring witnesses willing to attest to the
ownership.)  "If it belonged to you," the court would ask the aggrieved landowner, "Why did you
not collect rent?"  Taking a troublemaking renter to court is costly, because the landowner must
bring three witnesses to testify, and the trip to the court involves an entire day.8  These are the
costs and risks that a landowner must face when considering renting out extra land.
Over the years, governments have attempted to resolve competing discourses of 'chiefly'
ownership and 'cultivator' ownership.  The British regarded the claims of 'overlords' as
particularly problematic aspects of land tenure, sometimes supporting them when politically
expedient, sometimes reinterpreting them as claims to dues rather than claims to ownership.9 
Numerous state edicts- from the land ordinance of 1925 to the Unregistered Lands Act of 1970
and the Civil Transactions Act of 1984- have declared that unregistered land belongs to the
state.10
The contested applicability of these laws at the village level creates uncertainty.  Several
extension agents from the Kordofan Forestry Department came to Bireka one day, and asked
8the sheikh and omda for land along the khur to start a community forestry project.  The omda
agreed, and showed them a large area of uncultivated bush land that lay between the village
and the khur.  The land was prone to flooding, and the soil was heavy in clay, making it difficult
to weed.  Within three days of this tentative agreement, however, three older relatives of one of
the poor Arab villagers had ridden to Bireka from their village several hours away, and met with
the omda, arguing that their family owned the land.  Even though they had no intention of using
the land or developing it, the omda agreed with them, and informed the Forestry Department
that there was no land available for the project.
State edicts have perhaps generated more uncertainty than they resolved for two
reasons.  First, the problematic dual capacity of local tribal leaders as both owners and
administrators of land parallels the wider national-level ambiguity regarding the role of
'traditional' institutions in state structures.11  The senior tribal authorities, the nazir and omda,
have seen their formal authority wax and wane with the succession of regimes that have ruled
Sudan since the Turkish invasion of 1821.  The British elevated their status to one of formal
authority during the period of Native Administration, but towards the latter half of colonial rule
attempted to undermine them with rural councils.  After independence some regimes found it
convenient to allow traditional leaders to dominate the councils.  The next two decades,
however, saw a reversal of fortunes.  The regime of Jaafar Nimeiri banned sheikhs and omda's
from rural councils, and stripped them of formal authority.  The present regime has reversed the
direction of policy, going back to the British and devolving tax authority and power to adjudicate
local disputes and crimes.  The sheikh and omda now have considerably more influence in local
land tenure issues.
A second reason for the enduring influence of local leaders in land issues is that
decisions regarding land are deeply imbricated with inter-ethnic politics.  S. Berry has observed
that people in many parts of Africa, "have asserted claims to rural land in order to establish or
validate their membership in a social group or category- rather than vice versa."12  Denying a
9renter's claim that he or she owns the rented land, then, involves denying their membership in
the community.  Traditional leaders might use land holding, rather than village residence, as the
criterion for membership in the community.  Arab residents in Bireka, for instance, would say to
the Hausa, in critical moments, "Do you have land here?"  The implication was that the Arabs
could evict the Hausa from their land and the village, should they be pushed.  Hausa might
sometimes say, "This is not my village; I am a stranger here because I have no land."
One of the first actions of the omda, after the new regime formally invested him with
authority, was to prevent a wealthy Hausa farmer from investing in an irrigated garden along the
khur.  No one doubted that the Hausa man had farmed the field for more than four decades. 
Technically, the issue was whether the field had not originally been cleared by an Arab farmer,
who had left the village shortly thereafter.  If it had, then the land could be considered to have
reverted to the sheikh, even though the Hausa man continued cultivating it without paying rent. 
The technical point justified the Arab leaders' involvement in the minor land dispute, and
enabled them to insert the dispute into the underlying conflict among different ethnic
constituencies.  These political issues of membership in the village community explain why
some villagers resisted state attempts to disempower tribal leaders.
Given these multiple and complex sources of tenure and rental insecurity, we might not
expect the land rental market to perform very well.  Landowners, especially those who are
traditional leaders, might be very worried about their inability to reclaim land rented out.  They
might well prefer to hire wage labor and cultivate on their own account rather than rent out to
other farmers.  As noted above, this implies that there might be a misallocation of land, with
farmers cultivating land extensively in order to retain their ownership and usufruct rights. 
Patterns of productivity indeed are consistent with models of farm-choices under conditions of
rental insecurity and other market imperfections.  Wealthier farmers in Sheikan usually obtain
higher yields per hectare than do poorer farmers; they use more labor per hectare.13  This
pattern of productivity is, however, also consistent with other models; when credit and insurance
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markets perform poorly we might also expect to a positive relationship between wealth and
productivity.  We must examine land rental markets directly in order to determine whether they
are responsible for the misallocation of land and labor.
3.  Land Rental Markets in Sheikan
The rental market in Sheikan is very active.  Table 1 presents data on land rental
transactions in Bireka and for a sample of 116 household heads in six villages in the area
around the market center of Jaibat.  The data was collected by the author in the fall of 1990.14 
The respondents are broken down according to household status of the farm 'manager' who
controls the income and directs the activities.  Male household heads control most fields,
mobilizing family labor, especially that of unmarried sons.  (Among the Hausa, married women
are discouraged from working in agriculture.)  Female household heads also cultivate family
farms.  Finally, married women and many unmarried women cultivate their own fields, using
only their own labor, and working on Fridays and evenings (women's personal farms).  Land
rental accounted for a substantial proportion of land used in cultivation.  A total of 122 out of 364
fields (34 percent) were rented by the Jaibat sample households.  In terms of area, the total
rented was also approximately thirty-three percent.  For Bireka forty-two percent of the area
planted was rented.  More than sixty percent of male household heads rented at least one field.
Villagers did not confine their transactions to the boundaries of village land.  In the Jaibat
sample 250 out of 413 rented mukhammas were rented from other villages.  Many renters
travelled quite far for land, especially wealthier farmers who had more connections and desired
to cultivate more land.  Poorer farmers tended to rent within the village.  A group from Bireka
rented land almost four hour's walk south of the village.
There is evidence consistent with rental insecurity.  In the Jaibat sample, sixty percent of
fields rented had been rented for four years or less; only forty percent for longer than four years. 
In Bireka eighteen out of twenty-one renters had rented a new plot during the last seven years. 
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Fields were often cultivated for twenty to thirty years, so this relatively rapid turnover may be an
indicator that landowners avoided situations where renters would occupy a single piece of land
for a long time.15  Indeed, six renters in the Jaibat sample complained of incidents in the last
year where landowners took land back.
But Table 2 provides an indication that on the whole the Sheikan rental market facilitated
efficient and socially desirable adjustment (matching labor to land).  Renters had more
household labor and owned less land.  The data from Bireka is striking in this regard; the ratio of
land owned to labor for households renting out was higher than seven, that for households not
renting was two and one-half, and that for households renting in was less than one and one-
half.  The order was reversed after households engaged in rental transactions, indicating
considerable adjustment in the land market.  The data is similar for Jaibat.  Data on land rented
out by each household were not collected, however, and so any households renting out were
grouped with non-renters.  Their ratio of land owned to household labor is higher than that of
households renting in land.16
A more formal statistical test of market performance also supports the view of a well-
functioning rental market.  In their study of the Indian village of Palanpur, Bliss and Stern
introduced an econometric approach to determining whether land rental patterns could be
explained as adjustments to imperfections in markets for other factors of production.17  They
postulated that farmers determined a notional 'desired cultivated area' DCA according to the
amount of non-marketed inputs they possessed, namely family labor L^  and bullocks B.  These
inputs would be idle or have extremely low marginal products if the household could not acquire
land to match them.18  Farmers would attempt, to varying degrees of success, to make up the
difference between desired area and owned area through the rental market.  That is NLI (for 'net
leased-in') could be expressed as:
           NLI = "[DCA(L^ ,B) - M],
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where M is the area of land owned by the farmer.  The parameter " reflects market
imperfections in the rental market, such as rental insecurity or rigid prices caused by norms of
fairness, both of which imply rationing and an imperfect matching of 'notional' demand with
market allocations.
Bliss and Stern estimated a linear approximation:
            NLI = c + "ß1L^  + "ß2B - "M,
where ß1 and ß2 reflect how much the two non-marketed inputs affect the desired cultivated
area, and c is a constant, and found that for their sample the estimate of the coefficient on
owned area was -0.78, not equal to minus one.  As they put it, "the hypothesis that the choice of
cultivated area is not influenced by the land area owned (perfect adjustment through leasing) is
decisively rejected."19  Their two findings- that non-marketed factors explained land rental
patterns and that the rental market could not completely compensate for imperfections in other
factor markets- were corroborated by C. Pant and I. Nabi using data sets from the Semi-arid
zones in India and from Pakistan, respectively.20  R. Srivastava, however, found that household
labor and bullocks explained very little of the variation in land rented in a sample from Uttar
Pradesh.21  M. Taslim and F. Ahmed found that for one village in Bangladesh they could not
reject the hypothesis of a 'perfect' rental market, while in another village the rental market was
apparently imperfect.22
We would like to apply this test of rental market performance to the data from Sheikan,
but must resolve some differences between the environment in Sheikan and that of the Asian
cases.  In Sheikan there are no non-marketed inputs like bullocks, tractors, or irrigation
equipment, since almost no modern inputs or techniques are used on the extensive agriculture
that dominates the rural production system.23  Since the farming system has not changed
greatly over the past decades, there are no great variations in knowledge; additionally, very few
of the adult farmers have had formal schooling.  It is true that skills pertaining to the cultivation
of specific fields, of the sort described by M. Rosenzweig and K. Wolpin, are by definition non-
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marketed inputs.24  We have no way of measuring these skills, but the extreme Semi-arid
environment mutes the bias caused by omitting knowledge of field-specific idiosyncracies (by
contrast with places where drainage and slope are significant).  Land and labor, then, are the
only relevant, measurable inputs.
Sheikan has reasonably well-functioning markets for labor.  Wages are flexible, women
constitute almost a third of the wage labor force, and children sometimes work with their parents
on the fields of employers.  Households adjust their land and labor endowments through the
labor market, with labor abundant households hiring out labor and land abundant households
hiring in labor.  They will not fully adjust, however, because labor hiring must be financed before
the harvest is realized, and there is no functioning credit market in the Sheikan area. 
Landowning households with little financial capital cannot borrow money to hire laborers; on the
contrary, they must work as laborers to meet their subsistence needs during the four or five
months of the agricultural season.  Wealth, or liquidity, is the non-marketed 'input' that
determines the demand for land, and we would expect assets to be a significant determinant of
rental patterns, after controlling for household land and labor endowments.
We may derive an estimating equation from the farmer's maximization problem.  The
farm household chooses an amount of land to rent K and labor to hire L, constrained by the
requirement that assets and access to credit A must be sufficient to meet a fixed subsistence
requirement J and payments to hired labor (a household will not simultaneously be hiring labor
and working outside the farm).  The constraint is:
                A - wL - J > 0,
where w is the wage rate.  The problem for the farmer is then is to choose an amount of labor to
hire and an amount of land to rent in:
max  F(M+K,L^ +L) - rK - wL + :(A - wL - J),
where : is the Lagrange multiplier, r is the rental rate, and M and L^  are the endowments of
family land and labor.25
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Assuming all households are constrained (reasonable if the production function does not
exhibit strong decreasing returns to scale) but not enough that they must hire out all of their
labor, the first order conditions are:
                           FK - r = 0
                     FL - w(1+:) = 0
                   A - wL - J = 0.
where Fi indicates the derivative of the production function. Straightforward manipulations reveal
that:
So in an equation,
NLI = c + "1L^  + "2A + "3M, 
the test of imperfections in the rental market is again whether "3 is different from minus one.26
We estimate this equation using the data from Bireka.  We cannot carry out the same
regression analysis for the Jaibat sample because of an important measurement and truncation
problem with the data.  Land rented out by each household was not on the survey
questionnaire, and so the measure of land-owned underestimates the actual land owned, and
net land rented is truncated at zero- it does not include land rented out.  While the truncation
problem could conceivably be corrected, the measurement error of land owned will bias the
coefficient away from minus one; households that rent out are incorrectly seen as cultivating
only their own (mis-measured) land.
Before reporting the results, we should note that the Bireka data also suffers from
formidable measurement error.  Both land variables- owned and cultivated- are measured with
error due to the absence of direct physical measures of the area.  Villagers have well-defined
notion of the mukhammas, using a standard size stick used to measure out an area to be
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weeded when hiring labor, but the fields are very irregularly shaped, and it unlikely that anyone
has every taken the time to directly measure their plots.  The variable for household labor
endowment is very approximate, and we have used two fairly crude dummy variables for wealth
categories.  Given all of these data constraints, it would be inappropriate to see this hypothesis
test as anything more than a preliminary exercise.27
Table 3 defines the variables included in the analysis, and shows their means for the
various categories of participation in rental markets.  In addition to variables measuring family
labor endowment, household assets, children (representing necessary consumption
expenditures), and land owned, we also include dummy variables for ethnicity and gender of
household head.  The Hausa in Bireka rented much more land than villagers from other ethnic
groups.  Twenty-one Hausa farmers (75% of the Hausa households) rented a total of 162
mukhammas, while only four Burgo and four Arab households rented in, for a total of only thirty-
six mukhammas.  This was to be expected, since the Hausa, as relatively recent settlers, owned
little land in the village.  But the Hausa rented only fifteen plots from landowners within the
village, and thirty-two from outside, while all of the Arab and Burgo rentals were within the
village.  The Arab and Burgo landowners appeared much more likely to rent to farmers from the
same ethnic group.  We noted above the political competitions among ethnic groups that might
restrict participation in rental markets.  
Rental transactions were very much easier to carry out, apparently, when the transactors
were male household heads.  In the Jaibat sample sixty-one out of ninety-one male household
heads rented land.  Only four female headed households rented fields, and three of these
households were landless.  In Bireka no female household heads rented in land.28
In a second specification we explore the possibility that rental patterns are influenced by
the specific nature of a household's endowment of land- if we think of households as managing
portfolios of agricultural activities, then endowments of soil types, locations, and fertilities should
influence rental patterns.  All other things equal, a household with only one type of land, in one
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location, will be more desirous of renting land in other locations and of other types; the benefits
from diversification may outweigh transactions costs and inertia.
The important result to note from Table 4 is that the estimated coefficient for land owned,
TOTOWN, is not significantly different from minus one in any specification, confirming our
earlier assessment of the rental market as functioning well.  The dummy variable RICH is
significant in all four specifications, attesting to importance of assets as a non-marketed input
determining desired cultivation patterns- wealthy people rent in land instead of financing poor
farmers because the transactions costs from lending money are too high.  Household labor is
significant in three of the specifications, and has a positive sign- indicating some imperfections
in labor markets.  The dummy variables for female headed households, and the ethnicity
dummy variables, were insignificant.  Gender and ethnic discrimination were apparently not
binding constraints in the rental market.
The various measures of quality and dispersion of land endowments yield a mixed
pattern of results.  Specification (3) has OLDDIR#- the number of different locations of owned
land- as significant but positive.  We might have expected that the more dispersed owned land
was, the less the farmer would benefit from renting.  OLDST#, the number of soil types, is
significant and with the correct sign.  These variables appear sensitive to measurement- when
recast in specification (4) in terms of the amount of land in particular locations or of particular
qualities, they are not significant.
The data for the ten largest residuals of the basic specification (1) are presented in
Table 5.  The five cases where the equation underpredicts rental area are a diverse group. 
Cases 1 and 3 are poor Hausa men with large families.  They also earned steady incomes from
outside employment- one as a leather tanner the other as a market porter- and this income is
not reflected in their assets.  They were in a position to cultivate on a larger scale than other
farmers.  Case 45 was a poor Arab who typically cultivated optimistically- often leaving large
areas unweeded.  Case 67 is a man famous for never sleeping; the equation predicts he should
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have rented out, but he worked day and night on his fields cultivating a large area.  Case 79 is a
very wealthy storeowner who cultivated vast tracts, by local standards.  The RICH dummy
variable was too small for him.
The cases with negative residuals share a common story.  Cases 44, 69, 77 and 78
were all men busy with local political affairs or who had jobs outside the village and so did not
have time to manage their agriculture.  They rented less than predicted, or rented out much of
their land.  Case 5 is an old man whose sons also cultivated on their own account.  Note that
these exceptional cases were from all three ethnic groups, and of different economic categories. 
The rental market seemed to accommodate their specific needs reasonably well.
4.  Conclusion
It might be appropriate to discuss briefly some issues of policy, even through the broad
thrust of this paper is that there is no urgent need for tenure reform.  Most policy discussions
pose an opposition between private and corporate ownership.  Neither of these two poles
seems appropriate for Sheikan district.  Formalizing and registering private rights to land could
indeed mitigate the costs of most of rental disputes, and facilitate their resolution, by creating a
centralized record of initial ownership and subsequent transactions.  But the benefits of
implementing such a register in western Sudan are probably small, while the costs are high. 
The benefits are small because usually village disputes are over boundaries and small plots on
the borders of established fields.  They create a lot of animus, but not necessarily losses in
production.29  Furthermore, tenure insecurity results primarily from the ambiguous position of
village sheikhs and other 'tribal' leaders.  This political component to tenure insecurity raises the
costs of determining and formalizing the ownership of all fields.  In any case, the rental market
seems to function fairly efficiently.
The benefits and costs of corporate ownership are similarly ambiguous.  In the case of
disputes between villagers and nomads, and between sheikhs, it may be in the interest of the
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villagers to maintain the legal fiction of 'village land'.  The corporateness of the community is
necessary when confronted with corporate land invasions.  There is a bit of the classic
coordination problem here- until other villages adopt private property, and until nomads are also
allocated private ranches, it pays the villagers to act corporately when the land of a villager is
encroached upon.  Acting singly, they are vulnerable to being defeated by the superior
resources of the 'corporate raiders'.  Acting together, they are more able to resist.
D. Atwood has noted another benefit from formalizing corporate ownership: "a simple
and well-publicized government decree declaring the validity of certain kinds of land claims or
transactions may be much less costly, and as effective, as a major land titling program."30  In the
Côte d'Ivoire the government declared that renters from outside the village could not claim
ownership over land.  Previously farmers were unwilling to rent for fear that capitalists intent on
establishing export-oriented production would claim the land.
There are problems with encouraging movement down the slippery road towards
corporate ownership.  As we noted, land and community are often intertwined with inter-ethnic
politics.  Involving national government officials and bureaucracies in these politics is a costly
and uncertain business.  A policy of supporting corporate ownership would also still leave
unaddressed the fundamental issue of the role of the sheikh in administering village land.
The reasonable recommendation is to broaden the range of options away from the all-or-
nothing policies of comprehensive registration or corporate ownership, and to adopt an
incrementalist perspective.  This first involves a research agenda that combines economic and
social approaches.  Indigenous tenure systems must be examined with care, in order to
determine their flexibility and efficiency.  The outcomes of rental and sales transactions must be
weighed using some metric of social desirability; most often by the criterion of providing
reasonable access.  A growing literature suggests that in a great many cases indigenous
institutions perform well.  A second step is to develop alternatives to land registration. 
Researchers have noted the increasing use of informal local ownership affidavits and deeds.31 
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A policy of allowing local administrators to certify contracts for new land rental transactions
might be appropriate.  Restricting the certification of the contracts to situations where both
parties agree to the contract would help keep the administrative costs of such a system to a
minimum.  Absence of a written contract would not be viewed, in the judicial and administrative
system, as evidence of illegal occupation.  Quite the contrary, it could equally be viewed as
evidence of a spurious claim by the pseudo-landowner.
These incremental policies are likely to develop naturally from an interdisciplinary
perspective on African land tenure.  S. Berry has recently drawn a convincing picture of the
actual variation, across the continent, in the relative influence of social versus market
considerations in the allocation of land and labor.32  The extensiveness of the land market in
western Sudan represents an important extreme, where land is not allocated primarily through
social networks.  Public policy and academic research framed in terms of markets is not
necessarily irrelevant.  But neither is it sufficient.  As the discussion on tenure representations
and rental insecurity makes clear, a number of fundamental social processes underlie land
tenure in western Sudan, and the land rental market cannot be understood without reference to
them.  Future approaches to land tenure should combine the neoclassical emphasis on the
relations between land rights, factor allocation, investment and credit, with an alternative
socially-grounded exploration of land rights, community membership and local power relations.
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 Table 1: Extent of Renting and Landholding by Farm Type
W4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
                                          BIREKA                 
                        Male headed    Female headed   Women's personal
                          households     households          farms
                            (n=48)          (n=7)            (n=25)   
S)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))Q
 Total Area Cultivateda        412             33               31
 Percent Area Rented           46%             0%              26%
 Percent Renting Land          60%             0%              28%
 Percent Owning No Land        21%             0%              29%
S)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
                                          JAIBAT                       
                        Male headed    Female headed   Women's personal
                          households     households          farms     
                            (n=95)          (n=21)           (n=45)    
S))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))Q
 Total Area Cultivated       1109             88              175      
 Percent Area Rented           36%            13%              26%     
 Percent Renting Land          62%            24%              24%     
 Percent Owning No Land        14%            14%              18%     
S))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
 
aLand is measured in mukhammas.                                    
                                         
 Table 2: Differences in Means of Selected Variables
          Between Renting and Non-Renting Household Headsa
W444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444U
                                          BIREKA                 
                          Renting Out   Non-Renters   Renting In 
                             (n=10)       (n=16)        (n=29)   
                          S)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))Q
 Land Owned Per Laborerb      7.29         2.53          1.43    
                             (3.79)       (1.06)        (2.05)
 Land Planted Per Laborer     3.63         2.40          5.41 
                             (1.94)       (0.88)        (6.88)
S)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))Q                         
                            JAIBAT                 
                                 Non-Renters   Renting In        
                                   (n=52)        (n=64)          
                           S))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))Q
 Land Owned Per Laborerb            3.26         1.90 
                                   (2.21)       (1.86)
 Land Planted Per Laborer           2.84         3.73
                                   (1.83)       (2.10)
S)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))Q
 
aThis table excludes the personal farms of women.
 
bThe number of laborers is calculated by adding the             
 number of older children to the number of parents, two          
 for male headed households, one for female headed house-        
 hold.  Land is measured in mukhammas.
 
cStandard deviations are in parentheses.
 
dThe differences among means of land owned per laborer are
  significant for both samples at the 1% level, for land planted the
  differences are significant in the Jaibat sample but not Bireka.
S)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))Q
                  
 Table 3: Definitions and Means of Variables Used in Regression
          Analysis of Rental Behavior (from Bireka Sample)  
W44444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444U
 Basic variables
 TOTRENT  Total land rented, in mukhammas, by each household 
 TOTOWN   Total land area, in mukhammas, owned by household  
 LABOR    The number of household laborers available to the
          household head
 RICH     Dummy variable if household is wealthy, for Bireka 
 MIDDLE   Dummy variable if household is middle, for Bireka
 FEMALE   Dummy for households headed by women               
 HAUSA    Dummy for Hausa households
 BURGO    Dummy for Burgo households
 Land quality and location variables
 OLDDIR#  Number of sites (out of eight) where owned fields located
 OLDST#   Number of soil types (sandy goz, clayey soil, poor quality
          hardpan naga'a soil) characterizing owned fields          
 OLDFAL#  Number of fallow types (cultivated, fallow, bush)
          characterizing owned fields
 OLDNAGA  Owned area that is poor quality soil, in mukhammas
 OLDKHUR  Owned area along the khur, in mukhammas
 OLDBURA  Owned land that was fallow, in mukhammas
S)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))Q
              RENTING OUT      NOT RENTING      RENTING IN               
Variable        n = 10           n = 17           n = 29
S)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))Q
 RENTOT         -6.08            0.00             6.55       
 TOTOWN         13.93            5.47             4.04       
 LABOR           2.13            2.35             2.76       
 RICH            0.20            0.12             0.21
 MIDDLE          0.30            0.35             0.34
 FEMALE          0.20            0.35             0.00
 HAUSA           0.00            0.29             0.69
 BURGO           0.40            0.29             0.14
 OLDDIR#         2.43            1.82             1.00
 OLDST#          2.10            1.82             1.03
 OLDFAL#         1.40            1.41             0.69
 OLDNAGA         1.43            2.00             1.26
 OLDKHUR         1.35            0.93             0.60
 OLDBURA         1.40            1.22             0.71
S)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))Q        
 Table 4: Regression Results Explaining Area Rented by Each Household (in mukhammas)  
W444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
 Variable        (1)           (2)           (3)                          (4) 
 (CONSTANT)     4.07***       3.24          2.59*                        3.83***
               (1.30)        (2.06)        (1.45)                       (1.41)
 TOTOWN        -0.91***      -0.82***      -1.08***                     -1.01***
               (0.13)        (0.15)        (0.15)                       (0.14)
 LABOR          0.75*         0.67          1.33***                      0.87*
               (0.41)        (0.42)        (0.45)                       (0.43)
 RICH           8.88***       7.95***       8.44***                      8.37***
               (2.14)        (2.28)        (2.05)                       (2.17)
 MIDDLE         1.47          1.49          1.15                         1.50
               (1.53)        (1.66)        (1.43)                       (1.59)
 FEMALE          -           -1.26         -2.51                        -1.45
                             (2.32)        (2.11)                       (2.15)
 HAUSA           -            1.77           -                            -
                             (1.97)                                        
 BURGO           -            0.06           -                            -
                             (2.12)
 OLDDIR#         -             -            3.80***        OLDKHUR       0.50
                                           (1.24)                       (0.49)
 OLSST#          -             -           -3.33**         OLDNAGA      -0.22
                                           (1.24)                       (0.31)
 OLDFAL#         -             -            0.85           OLDBURA       0.75
                                           (1.21)                       (0.47)
S))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
 Adjusted 
 R-Square:       .48           .47           .55                          .48
 F-Statistic:  13.35***       7.76***       9.40***                      7.45***
 Cases: 55    
S))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
 Note: *** means coefficient is significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level;
       standard errors are in parentheses.
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 Table 5: Values of Variables For Cases With Large Residualsa
W4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
     CASE  RENTOT   PREDRENT  ORIAREA   FAM     RICH    MIDDLE   ETHNIC
S))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
 Positive residuals
     1       6.00    -1.40    10.75     5.67      0       0      Hausa 
     3      11.80     3.70     3.45     3.67      0       0      Hausa 
    45       6.00     -.66     8.00     3.33      0       0      Arab 
    67        .00    -6.44    16.00     3.33      0       1      Burgo 
    79      34.50     9.85     4.25     1.00      1       0      Hausa 
 Negative residuals
     5       3.00     7.33      .00     4.33      0       0      Hausa 
    44      -1.50     2.98    13.50     3.00      1       0      Arab 
    69     -21.00   -16.05    25.50     2.00      0       1      Burgo 
    77       3.50     8.01     8.50     3.67      1       0      Hausa 
    78        .00    11.48     5.50     4.67      1       0      Hausa 
S))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
 
aResiduals are defined from basic equation (1) estimated in Table 5. 
  PREDRENT is the predicted value for RENTOT, and the residual is 
  RENTOT-PREDRENT. 

